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Abstract
Prior psychological work on Gricean implicature has revealed much about how listeners infer
(comprehension) but little about how speakers imply (production). This is surprising given the
inherent link between the two. This study aimed to obtain a more integral understanding of impli-
catures by investigating the processes that are shared between inference and implication. In two
experiments, a participant and a confederate engaged in a dialogue game that invited the use of
implicatures. In each there was a global priming manipulation, in which a confederate predomi-
nantly used implicit or explicit utterances, and a local priming manipulation, in which the utter-
ance structure varied from trial to trial. Participants could choose whether to imply or use an
explicit expression. Our results revealed that speaker and listener align on their use of implica-
tures. We interpret the local priming results as providing evidence of shared implicature represen-
tations between speaker and listener, and the global priming results as a form of audience design.
We also present a model of implicature production that explains our findings.
Keywords: Psycholinguistics; Pragmatics; Language production; Language comprehension;
Implicatures
1. Introduction
Utterances communicate much more than the literal meaning of the words. Consider
the examples below.
(1) A: I hear Helen’s husband is rich and intelligent.
B: Well, he’s rich.
(2) John ate some of the cookies.
Correspondence should be sent to Alice Rees, Linguistics & English Language, School of Philosophy,
Psychology, & Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, UK.
E-mail: al.b.rees.13@gmail.com
In (1) Speaker B says that Helen’s husband is rich, but implies that he is not intelli-
gent. In (2) the speaker says that John has eaten more than one of the cookies but implies
that he did not eat them all.
Implications like these illustrate that communication requires speakers and listeners to
reason about each other’s goals and intentions, rather than simply “decode” the input.
There are no words in (1), for example, that mean not intelligent. Instead, information
about Helen’s husband is communicated because the listener reasons about what the
speaker could have said (“he’s intelligent”), but didn’t (the alternative), and the speaker
recognizes that the listener is able to do this. Grice (1975) thus argued that speakers and
listeners must cooperate. Cooperation between interlocutors is seen as fundamental to
communication and has been intensely studied in the cognitive sciences (e.g., Breheny,
Katsos & Williams, 2006; Chierchia, 2004; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015; Geurts, 2010;
Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Katsos & Bishop, 2011; Levinson, 2000). However, this
research has focused on how the listener derives the correct inference, not how the
speaker produces an utterance that communicates the correct implication. Here we take
an initial step into understanding the speaker’s perspective and test whether implying and
inferring1 have overlapping mechanisms.
1.1. Gricean inferences
Inferences like those in (1) and (2) can be derived by assuming that the listener rea-
sons about what the speaker could have said but did not (Grice, 1975). By way of illus-
tration, consider the following account of the listener’s reasoning process in (2), adapted
from Geurts (2010, described as the “standard recipe”).
i. What could the speaker have said instead of (2)? What are the alternatives? One sali-
ent possibility is that the speaker could have used a stronger term and said, “John ate
all of the cookies.” Why didn’t they?
ii. Presumably, the speaker does not believe that “John ate all of the cookies” is true.
iii. The speaker has an opinion about whether “John ate all of the cookies” is true.
iv. Combining (ii) and (iii) yields the inference that the speaker believes John ate some
but not all of the cookies.
Reasoning with alternatives is generally accepted as the most plausible account of how
listeners derive these sorts of enrichments. This is true from a psychological perspective
(e.g., Bott & Chemla, 2016; Chemla & Bott, 2014; Rees & Bott, 2018; van Tiel &
Schaeken, 2016) just as much as from a linguistic perspective (e.g., Fox & Katzir, 2011;
Gazdar, 1979; Geurts, 2010; Horn, 1984; Katzir, 2007). However, while implying and
inferring are two sides of the same coin for linguistic theories, the psychological pro-
cesses used by the listener are fundamentally different from those used by the speaker.
Implying works in one direction (from concept to sound; i.e., language production), and
inferring works in the other (from sound to concept; i.e., language comprehension). While
the standard recipe above might translate into a good mechanistic account of the infer-
ence process, it does not capture the implication process.
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How, then, would an implication be produced? We know of no work that has
addressed this question, but as a starting point, we suggest the following (based on
Levelt, 1989):
1. A message, F, is conceived and represented in non-linguistic form. Consider two
examples, one that could be expressed using an implication, F1, and one that could
not, F2. The first, F1, is a message with an upper-bound quantifier meaning,
9xCx John ate xð Þ½  ^ :8xCx John ate xð Þ½  (John ate some but not all of the cookies).
The second, F2, is a message with a lower-bound quantifier meaning,
9xCx John ate xð Þ½  (John ate some and possibly all of the cookies).
2. The message is transformed into a linguistic representation involving lexical ele-
ments and syntax, L, as in “John ate some but not all of the cookies,” L1, or “John
ate some of the cookies,” L2.
3. L is checked to establish whether it has an implication structure, S ^ :S0½ , where S
is a shorter sentence than L, and S0 is an alternative2 to S. L1 is consistent with this
structure but L2 is not.
4. If L is consistent with S ^ :S0½ , as in L1, it is reformulated as S, John ate some of
the cookies. Then, if the contextual constraints needed to make an implication are
satisfied, such as sufficient listener knowledge and shared goals, the sentence is
articulated, “John ate some of the cookies.” If L is not consistent with S ^ :S0½ , as
in L2, L is articulated directly without reformulation.
In summary, we assume that the speaker first conceptualizes and formulates an
enriched message but then later reduces it to a sentence that can be enriched by the lis-
tener (we consider alternative models in the General discussion).
Our hypothesis is that the representation S ^ :S0½  is shared across inference and impli-
cation, much like syntactic and semantic frames are shared across production and com-
prehension (Branigan & Pickering, 2017; Branigan, Pickering & Cleland, 2000). The
listener uses S ^ :S0½  as an enrichment frame to guide comprehension, and the speaker
uses the same representation to guide production. Pragmatic theories typically describe
Gricean implicatures as processes rather than representations, as in (i)–(iv) above, but
because processes are unidirectional, none of those suggested in the literature seem
appropriate to be shared across production and comprehension. We therefore present our
study as a test of shared representations, namely S ^ :S0½ .
1.2. Structural priming
We employed a structural priming task. Structural priming occurs when participants
are exposed to a particular linguistic structure on one trial (the prime), and then recovery
of the same structure is facilitated on a subsequent trial (the target). For example, in
Bock (1986), participants repeated a prime sentence that could be in active form (e.g.,
“One of the fans punched the referee”) or passive form (e.g., “The referee was punched
by one of the fans”), and then had to describe a picture. Participants were more likely to
describe a picture in passive form after they had repeated a passive prime sentence than
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an active prime sentence. Evidence exists that a large range of linguistic structures can be
primed. These include passive and active constructions (Bock, 1986; Bock & Loebell,
1990; Bock et al., 1992; Branigan et al., 1995), scoping with every (Chemla & Bott,
2014; Feiman & Snedeker, 2016; Raffray & Pickering, 2010) and double- and single-ob-
ject constructions (Pickering & Branigan, 1998).
Structural priming is often used as a technique to establish the existence of abstract
representations because in order for priming to occur the stimuli must share some aspect
of linguistic structure within the language processor (see Branigan & Pickering, 2017).
Thus, encountering one particular syntactic structure increases the activation of that repre-
sentation which, in turn, increases the likelihood of that representation being reused. For
example, Pickering and Branigan (1998) found that double-object syntactic constructions
and prepositional object syntactic constructions can be primed in the absence of lexical
overlap. They argued that since priming occurred in the absence of lexical overlap, syn-
tactic representations (“syntactic frames”) must exist that are abstract from lexical mate-
rial. Branigan, Pickering, and Cleland (2000) demonstrated priming between a
confederate and a participant in a dialogue-based communication task. Since the proce-
dure for language production is reversed for comprehension, in order for priming to occur
across modalities, there must be modality-independent accessible representations. Our use
of structural priming is underpinned by a similar logic to Branigan et al. Since implying
and inferring are the reverse processes in a similar way to production and comprehension,
we assume that in order to explain priming of enrichment between a speaker and a lis-
tener, there must be mechanisms that are shared across production and comprehension.
Participants in our task engaged in a dialogue-based, enrichment priming paradigm
based on Branigan, Pickering, and Cleland (2000). A participant and a confederate played
a communication game in which players took turns describing cards to each other. In
some conditions, the confederate used an implication to refer to a card and in others an
utterance that would cancel an implication. In each subsequent trial, the participant had
the choice between using an implication herself and using a literal expression. If implying
and inferring involve shared mechanisms, rates of implication by the participant should
be higher after she makes an inference (i.e., after the confederate implies) than after she
does not.
2. Experiment 1
The game involved the speaker describing one of four cards to the listener. On each
trial, cards were arranged according to the structure in Fig. 1. The structure invited infer-
ence and literal referring expressions. Experimental trials involved reference to the [A]
card (e.g., the card with the pencil) or the [AB] card (e.g., the card with the pencil and
book). Consider how a speaker could refer to the [A] card. One option would be a simple
noun phrase using the [A] object, such as “the card with the pencil.” However, note that
according to the structure in Fig. 1, the [A] object always occurred in two cards, the [A]
and the [AB] card. Thus, to resolve ambiguity about the referent, the listener would be
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obliged to derive a Gricean inference; namely, that because the speaker did not say the card
with the [A] and the [B] objects, they must mean the card with the [A] object only
(“because the speaker did not say the card with the pencil and the book, they must mean the
card with pencil only”). The other option would be to use a modified noun phrase using the
[A] object, such as “the card with the pencil only,” and be explicit. Now consider reference
to the [AB] card. Since there was an [AB] card but no [B]-only card, a simple noun phrase
involving the (B) object, such as “the card with the book,” was sufficient to identify the
[AB] card as the referent. However, by the same logic as the inference was derived for the
[A] card, using a simple noun phrase involves canceling (or suppressing) a Gricean infer-
ence that the speaker was referring to a [B]-only card (“because the speaker did not say the
card with the pencil and the book, they must mean the card with the book only”). Alterna-
tively, they could use a more explicit expression using a conjunction involving [A] and [B]
objects, as in “the card with the pencil and the book.” The dependent measure was the pro-
portion of times the participant used unmodified single noun phrases to describe the card.
We tested two forms of priming. The first, global priming, was a between-subject
manipulation. For one group of participants (the explicit group), the confederate always
used modified utterances to describe the [A] card (“The card with only a pencil”), but for
the other group (the implicit group), the confederate always used unmodified utterances
(“The card with a pencil”). Descriptions of [AB] cards were identical across conditions
and used a single referent (“The card with the book”). The representations that govern
the use of implicatures might become activated in alignment with the confederate. If so,
there should be a higher rate of unmodified single object utterances in the [A] card trials
(“The card with the pencil”) in the implicit group than the explicit group (or equivalently,
a lower rate of modified expressions). For the [AB] card trials, the predictions are more
complicated. If implicature representations are highly activated, a single object utterance
(“The card with the [B]”) would direct the listener to search for a [B]-only card. Since a
[B]-only card would not exist, use of a single object utterance would cause confusion
(albeit temporarily until the visual context forced the listener to reinterpret the utterance).
Fig. 1. Left panel shows object configuration. Right panel shows an example trial.
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A speaker with primed implicature representations might therefore choose to avoid unmodi-
fied single object utterances when referring to [AB] cards so that the listener is not disadvan-
taged. Thus, there should be a lower rate of unmodified single object utterances to [AB]
card trials (“The card with the book”) in the implicit group relative to the explicit group (or
equivalently, a higher rate of conjunction expressions in the implicit group).
Between-subject priming manipulations show large priming effects when used with
syntactic structures (Thothathiri & Snedeker, 2008), but their interpretation can be
ambiguous. In particular, participants might tailor their utterances to suit the addressee
by, for example, associating the use of quantity implicatures with a particular individual
(as in audience design effects, e.g., Brown-Schmidt, Yoon, & Ryskin, 2015; Garrod &
Doherty, 1994; Horton & Gerrig, 2002, 2005; Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000).
While this reflects priming of a sort, it may not reflect the same type of short-term prim-
ing of representations that are described in the structural priming literature. We therefore
introduced a within-subject priming manipulation, local priming, that was based on the
trial sequence, in addition to the global priming manipulation. The local priming manipu-
lation involved the confederate using an implication on some trials but canceling an
implication on others. It therefore applied only to the implicit group because this was the
only group where the confederate used an implicature.
For the local priming manipulation, there were four possible experimental confederate-
participant trial sequences: [A] ? [A], [AB] ? [A], [A] ? [AB], and [AB] ? [AB]. The
confederate always described the [A] card and the [AB] cards with simple noun phrases
(“The card with a pencil”). Thus, after the confederate described [A] cards, implicature rep-
resentations should be activated immediately since comprehension required deriving an
inference. Conversely, implicature representations should be suppressed after the confeder-
ate described [AB] cards since comprehension might require canceling an inference.3
When the participant described subsequent [A] cards, there should be a higher rate of
implications after [A] cards than [AB] cards, that is, a higher rate on [A] ? [A] than
[AB] ? [A] target trials.
When the participant described subsequent [AB] cards, the effect should be reversed.
Participant descriptions of [AB] cards should have lower rates of simple noun phrases fol-
lowing [A] cards than following [AB] cards. This is because the participant believes that
the confederate will derive the inference in the [A] ? [AB] trials, and wishes to counter
this view to avoid misleading the confederate, whereas they do not believe the confeder-
ate will derive the inference in the [AB] ? [AB] trials).
Consequently an interaction is expected between type of confederate trial and type of
participant trial, with rate of unmodified noun phrases as the dependent measure.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Thirty-five Cardiff University students (30 female) participated for payment or course
credit.
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2.1.2. Materials and counterbalancing
There were five objects in each display, organized according to Fig. 1. The five objects
were different on every trial. The locations of the card types [A, AB, C, DE] were rotated
across trials so that each card type appeared equally often in the four possible display
positions. Different objects were used on every trial.
Confederate and participant alternated speaking. There were four experimental prime-
target sequences [A ? A; AB ? A; A ? AB; and AB ? AB] and eight examples of
each (32 trial pairs in total). Each experimental sequence was separated by a filler pair.
Filler pairs tested C and DE cards. Presentation order was in one of two lists. One order
was the reverse of the other.
Eight practice pairs were presented at the start of the experiment to acquaint partici-
pants with the procedure. These were a mixture of [A], [AB], [C], and [DE] trials, and
they were indistinguishable from the main experimental trials. Consequently, there were
32 experimental pairs + 32 filler pairs + 8 practice pairs = 144 trials in total.
In the explicit condition, confederates described the [A] card with a modified noun
phrase using one of four modifiers: ’“only,” “just,” “on its own,” and “by itself.”
2.1.3. Procedure
Interlocutors sat at opposite sides of a table separated by two monitors (see Fig. 2).
They were instructed to describe the card highlighted in bold when it was their turn to be
speaker and to identify which card was being described when they were listener. Identifi-
cation of the card was indicated by pressing one of four buttons on the keyboard. Inter-
locutors were treated identically by the experimenter throughout and the participant was
not made aware that the confederate was not a genuine participant.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Analysis procedure
Utterances were coded with respect to whether they were unmodified single object utter-
ances, for example, “The card with a pencil,” or the alternative utterance type. For [A] card
trials, the alternative was to use a modifier with the object, for example, “The card with only
a pencil” (i.e., to be explicit). For [AB] cards, the alternative was to describe both objects,
for example, “The card with a pencil and a ruler.” The dependent variable throughout was
the proportion of unmodified single object utterances. Data underwent a logit transformation
and were analyzed using ANOVA. For non-significant comparisons, we report Bayes factors
(Dienes, 2011, 2014; Rouder et al., 2009) using the JZS prior (0.707).
We excluded 22 out of 1,120 utterances because of an error in a picture. As listeners,
participants selected the correct card 98% of the time.
2.2.2. Global priming
Participants in the implicit condition produced more implicit utterances than those in
the explicit condition (F(1, 31) = 125.11, p < .001, 95% CI = 3.88–5.61). Participants in
A. Rees, L. Bott / Cognitive Science 44 (2019) 7 of 21
the implicit condition produced a greater proportion of unmodified single object utter-
ances (implicatures) on the A card trials than those in the explicit condition, M = 0.91
versus M = 0.18, (F(1, 31) = 108.50, p < .001, 95% CI = 4.17–4.20). Thus, the produc-
tion choices of the participant were influenced by the confederate. Surprisingly, however,
there were also differences on the AB cards (which were described with a single object
utterance in both conditions). Participants in the implicit condition used significantly more
unmodified single object utterances than those in the explicit condition, M = 0.82 versus
M = 0.15, (F(1, 31) = 58.21, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.27–0.50) (participants who did not
use single object utterances used conjunctions involving both objects). Note that the latter
effect is in the opposite direction to predictions of a shared implicature representation
account. If implicature mechanisms were more strongly activated in the implicit condi-
tion, an utterance of the form, “The card with a [B]” would strongly (and misleadingly)
imply a card with a [B] and nothing else. Participants in the implicit condition should
therefore have used more conjunctions than those in the explicit condition so as to avoid
Fig. 2. Experiment set-up. Highlighted card shows participant which card to describe.
8 of 21 A. Rees, L. Bott / Cognitive Science 44 (2019)
directing the listener to search for a card that was not present. This effect therefore sug-
gests that processes in addition to implicature mechanisms were being primed with the
global manipulation. We discuss this further in the GD.
One explanation for the effect on the A card was that lexical material (modifiers) were
primed in the explicit condition. For example, after hearing “The card with only an [A],”
the modifier “only” could become particularly salient and influence the choice about
whether to use an implicature or a modified expression. To test this, we examined the
modifiers used by the participant as a function of the modifiers used by the confederate.
If the priming effect were lexically based, participants should use the same modifier on
trial N as the confederate used in trial N1. Fig. 3 shows the results for the explicit con-
dition (modified responses were too low to be meaningful in the implicit condition). For
each modifier, there were a large proportion of explicit responses that were not the same
as the confederate. For example, for “only,” 60% of the responses used a different modi-
fier while 18% used the same modifier (the remainder used an unmodified expression).
The proportion of trials in which the same modifier was used was sufficiently small that
we were able to analyse the data after removing these trials (4.5%). When we did this,
participants were still more likely to use unmodified utterances when the confederate was
also implicit, (F(1, 31) = 98.00, p < .001, 95% CI = 4.01–6.09). Thus, the priming effect
cannot be entirely due to lexical priming.
2.2.3. Local priming
We tested local priming effects by analyzing participant utterances to target trials ([A]
and [AB]) as a function of the preceding prime trials ([A] and [AB]). The dependent
measure was the (transformed) proportion of unmodified single object utterances. As
described above, there was no theoretical reason to expect effects in the explicit group
and so we report the local analysis for the implicit group only (although the relevant
comparisons are significant even when the explicit group are included).
Fig. 3. Proportion of responses using the same, different, or no modifier.
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We found no main effect of prime (F(1, 16) = 1.43, p = .249, BF = 0.30, 95%
CI = 0.52–0.15) nor target (F(1, 16) = 1.76, p = .20, BF = 1.31, 95% CI = 0.32–
1.40). However, there was an interaction between prime and target (F(1, 16) = 9.99,
p = .006) whereby the unmodified single object prime raised the rate of unmodified sin-
gle object utterances to [A] cards but lowered them for [AB] cards (see Fig. 4), as pre-
dicted by an implicature representation account. Pairwise comparisons showed that this
effect was significant on the AB trials but not the A trials (t(16) = 2.53, p = .022; t
(16) = 1.52, p = .148, BF = 0.65).
3. Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 showed significant priming of enrichment at the local and
the global level. However, while the local priming results were consistent with shared
implicature representations, the direction of the global priming effects was not. We there-
fore decided to replicate Experiment 1 (with one minor change).
The global and local priming manipulations of Experiment 2 were the same as those in
Experiment 1. However, we varied whether the partner in the communication game was
presented as another player or as the experimenter. One group of participants played the
communication game against a confederate, with a distinct experimenter providing
instructions, etc. (just as in Experiment 1), and the other half played against the experi-
menter directly, without the presence of a confederate. Our motivation for including the
partner manipulation was that we thought it possible that an individual’s perception of
Fig. 4. Proportion of implicit responses to targets for the implicit condition. Black bars correspond to A
prime trials, and white bars correspond to AB prime trials.
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their interlocutor might influence the degree of priming (e.g., Bandura & Kupers, 1964;
Branigan, Pickering, Pearson, & McLean, 2010; Lakin, Chartrand, & Arkin, 2008;
McGuigan, 2013; van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 2004). For
example, when the player was perceived as being in the participant’s in-group, there
might be more imitation compared to when they were not (see, e.g., Bourgeois & Hess,
2008; Welkowitz, Feldstein, Finkelstein, & Aylesworth, 1972; Yarbar, Johnston, Miles, &
Peace, 2006). In the event, however, we saw no effects of the player manipulation. We
therefore present the experiment as a partial replication of Experiment 1 and leave the
social components of enrichment to further research.
3.1. Participants
Forty participants from the Cardiff University were recruited and received either course
credit or payment. Ten were assigned to each condition.
3.2. Design and materials
The materials and design were the same as in Experiment 2 apart from the partner
manipulation.
In the participant condition, the researcher took the role of the partner participant, just
as in Experiment 1. There was a third person who acted as experimenter. In the experi-
menter condition, the researcher took the role of experimenter and partner. They




Numerically, participants produced more unmodified single object descriptions when
they knew the confederate was the experimenter compared to when they thought the con-
federate was another participant (see Fig. 5). Despite the numerical difference, this was
not statistically significant (F(1, 36) = 1.13, p = .30, BF = 0.39, 95% CI = 1.28–0.40),
nor was there an interaction between the confederate role and the utterance form (F(1,
36) = .13, p = .73, BF = 0.3).
3.3.2. Global priming
The general pattern of results replicated those of Experiment 1. Participants in the
implicit condition produced more implicit utterances than those in the explicit condition
(F(1, 36) = 45.72, p < .001, 95% CI = 1.97–3.65). On the [A] card trials, participants in
the implicit condition produced a greater proportion of unmodified single object utter-
ances, M = 0.84 versus M = 0.21 (F(1, 36) = 74.64, p < .001, 95% CI = 3.08–5.00).
Thus, the production choices of the participant were influenced by the confederate’s
descriptions. This pattern was also observed for the [AB] cards. Participants in the
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implicit condition used significantly fewer unmodified single object utterances than those
in the explicit condition, M = 0.78 versus M = 0.56, (F(1, 36) = 5.06, p = .031, 95%
CI = .15–3.01) (participants who did not use single object utterances used conjunctions
involving both objects).
Participants’ use of modifiers was analyzed as in Experiment 1 to ensure that the glo-
bal priming results could not be accounted for by the repetition of lexical material. If the
priming effect was lexically based, then participants should use the same modifier as the
confederate used on the immediately preceding trial. As in Experiment 1, there was a
large proportion of responses that did not use the same modifier as the confederate (see
Fig. 6). The proportion of trials in which the same modifier was used was sufficiently
small that we were able to analyze the data after removing these trials (4.6%). When we
did this, participants were still more likely to use unmodified conditions when the confed-
erate was also implicit (F(1, 32) = 62.31, p < .001, 95% CI = 2.81–4.76).
3.3.3. Local priming
The pattern of findings from Experiment 1 was replicated (see Fig. 7). There was no
effect of prime (F(1, 32) = .016, p = .90, BF = 0.16) or target (F(1, 32) = 3.58,
p = .068, BF = 6.77). However, there was an interaction between prime type and target
(F(1, 32) = 6.64, p = .015). Following an [A] card prime, the rate of unmodified single
object utterances was increased for [A] cards, but for [AB] cards the rate was lowered.
We examined the interaction with pairwise comparisons and found significant effects on
Fig. 5. Proportion of unmodified single object utterances to targets. Black bars correspond to the participant
condition, and white bars correspond to the experimenter condition. Error bars show standard error.
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the AB targets but not the A targets (t(32) = 2.06, p = .046; t(32) = 1.52, p = .163,
BF = 0.49).
4. General discussion
In two studies we found that people can be primed to imply, at a global and a local
level, by generating an inference. These results suggest that there are shared mechanisms
Fig. 6. Proportion of responses using the same, different, or no modifier.
Fig. 7. Proportion of unmodified single object utterances to targets. Black bars correspond to [A] prime
cards, and white bars correspond to [AB] prime cards. Error bars show standard error.
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across inference and implication. We now discuss the global and local priming results
before turning to the production of implications more generally.
4.1. Global priming
The structures used by the confederate had a large effect on those used by the partici-
pant. Participants in the explicit condition, that is, when the confederate used a modified
noun phrase to describe the [A] cards (“the card with only the pencil”), were much more
likely to use a modifier then those in the implicit condition, that is, when the confederate
did not use a modifier (“the card with the pencil”). Furthermore, even though the confed-
erate referred to the [AB] cards in the same way in the explicit and implicit conditions
(using a single, unmodified noun, “The card with a book”), participants were more likely
to use a conjunction to describe the [AB] card (“The card with the book and the pencil”)
in the explicit than the implicit condition. There was clearly an alignment between con-
federate and participant. However, we cannot say definitively what was being aligned.
Three possibilities can be eliminated by the data. The first is that the modifier primed
participants; for example, hearing “only” primed participants to use “only” in their utter-
ances. When we removed utterances in which the participant used the same modifier as
the confederate, we still obtained significant priming effects, which argues against a mod-
ifier priming account. The second is that participants and confederate arrived at a “lexical
pact,” in which they agreed implicitly to use the same lexical expression on multiple tri-
als. This explanation can be eliminated because different referents were used on every
trial and so there was no opportunity for lexical entrainment. The third is that the mecha-
nisms involved in comprehending and producing quantity implicatures were aligned. As
we argued earlier, implicature alignment would be shown by a higher rate of conjunctions
for the [AB] cards in the implicit condition than the explicit condition, contrary to the
observed results.
Our (post hoc) explanation is that participants in the implicit condition perceived the
confederate to be concise, that is, using as few words as possible while maintaining a
minimum level of accuracy, and in the explicit condition, precise, that is, using more
words than strictly necessary but maximizing accuracy (in the form of minimizing the
possibility of errors arising in communication). Participants aligned with the balance
between the level of conciseness and preciseness of the confederate. That participants
were able to do this provides empirical support for classical pragmatic claims that com-
municators strive to maintain a balance between two fundamental principles of communi-
cation, the cost to the speaker versus the cost to the listener, as in Zipf’s (1949) “speaker
and auditor economies,” or similarly, Horn’s (1984) Q and R pragmatic principles, “say
as much as you can modulo truthfulness and R” and “say no more than you must, modulo
Q,” respectively (see also Rohde, Seyfarth, Clark, Jaeger, & Kaufman, 2012). In our task,
participants minimized the cost to the speaker in the implicit condition and the cost to
the listener in the explicit condition. Exactly how they did this is a topic for future
research, but computationally the process is not trivial. Participants would have to first
comprehend the confederate’s utterance and then calculate the minimal amount of verbal
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material needed to describe the referent, note whether the amount of material was greater
than this minimum, and then direct the production procedures to implement this conversa-
tional style.
A general explanation of global priming relates to the context in which the utterances
are used. In the present study, the meaning of “The card with the [A]” is underspecified;
it is an appropriate description for both the [AB] and the [A] card since it could mean
“The card with the [A] or the [AB].” Participants then use the context to decide which of
these it is. In the implicit condition, participants are primed to use the context to narrow
down the meaning; that is, that context is a reliable cue. Whereas in the explicit condi-
tion, participants are primed that the enrichment cannot be derived from the context.
4.2. Local priming
As well as alignment at a global level, we also found alignment on a trial-by-trial
basis. When describing [A] cards, participants were more likely to use an implication
when the confederate had previously used an implication ([A] cards described using an
unmodified noun phrase) than when the confederate had not ([AB] cards described using
a single object noun phase), and conversely, when describing [AB] cards, participants
were less likely to use a structure that could give rise to an inference ([AB] cards
described using a single object noun phase) when the confederate had previously used an
implication ([A] cards described using an unmodified noun phrase) than when the confed-
erate had not ([AB] cards described using a single object noun phase).
This pattern of data is consistent with shared representations across inference and
implication. After making an inference, appropriate sentence-level representations become
activated, such as S ^ :S0½ . In subsequent production trials, the representation remains
active and guides the formation of the utterance. In essence, the language processor rec-
ognizes that the interlocutor is primed to derive an inference. For [A] targets, it is thus
more likely that an implication will be produced (an unmodified noun phrase), and for
[AB] targets, it is thus more likely that the processor will take steps to cancel a potential
inference (by using an explicit structure such as the conjunctive noun phrase).
4.3. Toward a model of enrichment in production
This study demonstrates that Gricean enrichment involves an interaction between the
production system and the comprehension system, similar to other linguistic phenomena
(see Pickering & Garrod, 2004, 2013, for a review). Unlike other phenomena, however,
there are no mechanistic models of how enrichments are produced (only how they are
comprehended; for example, Bott, Bailey, & Grodner, 2012; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Bre-
heny, Katsos & Williams, 2006; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2015; Huang & Snedeker, 2009).
We therefore sketch a model of enrichment production which incorporates our findings
(see Fig. 8).
The basic problem is how a conceptualized message, for example, John ate some but
not all of the cookies, can be articulated in an implicit form, “John ate some of the cook-
ies” rather than in an explicit form, “John ate some but not all of the cookies.” The
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Fig. 8. A hypothesized model for implicature production, based on Hartsuicker and Kolk (2001). A message
to be articulated is generated at the conceptual level. This message is then transformed into a prearticulatory
code via formulator processes (grammatical and phonological encoding). The prearticulatory code gets sent to
the articulator for articulation (selection of phonological representations and programming of articulation) and
to the comprehension system for error monitoring. During standard error monitoring, if the prearticulatory
code does not match with the conceptual message generated, then speech is interrupted and formulation is
restarted. For implicatures the process is slightly different. During the monitoring procedure, the processor
recognizes that the formulation of the utterance corresponds with a simpler representation: the implicature. At
this point, the message is reformulated using the implicature representation.
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sentence must somehow undergo compression from initial conceptualization to final artic-
ulation. We suggest that the compression process is mediated by the error monitoring sys-
tem (e.g., Hartsuicker & Kolk, 2001), as follows. We assume that a message is
conceptualized in preverbal form, for example,9xCx John ate xð Þ½  ^ :8xCx John ate xð Þ½ .
The message is then transformed into a pre-articulated linguistic representation, F, involv-
ing lexical elements and syntax, “John ate some but not all of the cookies,” by a formula-
tor process. F is then passed through the error monitoring system to verify that the
formulated message corresponds to the intended message, as with any other sentence.
Crucially, the error checking process involves comprehension procedures that transform
the sentence back to its original pre-verbal representation. We suggest that at this point,
the processor recognizes that the representation of F, 9xCx John ate xð Þ½ 
^:8xCx John ate xð Þ½ , corresponds to a more abstract form S ^ :S0½ , with S as a shorter
representation, 9xCx John ate xð Þ½ , and S0 as its alternative, 8xCx John ate xð Þ½ , that is, a
Gricean enrichment. Furthermore, the process of recognizing that F is in Gricean form is
probabilistic, just as deriving implicatures is probabilistic in normal comprehension (since
implicatures are not obligatory), with a probability proportional to the activation of the
enrichment structure, S ^ :S0½ . The simplified sentence, S, can then passed back to the
formulator for reformulation and subsequently articulated.
The local priming effects that we observed can therefore be explained as follows. Con-
sider [A] ? [A] trials compared with [AB] ? [A] trials. In comprehending [A], the par-
ticipant is obliged to derive an inference, but not in comprehending [AB] (or the
inference is canceled if it is derived at all). This means that the representation S ^ :S0½ 
becomes more active in [A] than in [AB] trials, and remains so during the subsequent
production trials. When the participant formulates the initial sentence, F, in the [A] trial,
and feeds F back through the monitoring process, the elevated activation of S ^ :S0½ 
means that the processor is more likely to recognize that F has the S ^ :S0½  structure in
[A] trials than in [AB] trials. This in turn means that F is more likely to be reformulated
as an implication. A similar explanation holds for the difference between [A] ? [AB]
and [AB] ? [AB] trials. After [A] trials, the S ^ :S0½  representation is more active than
after [AB] trials, and the monitor is therefore more likely to recognize that an unmodified
noun phrase describing [AB] can be interpreted with an inference. Steps are therefore
taken to correct the potential misinterpretation by describing the [AB] referent with a
conjunction.
The model described above has many untested assumptions that may turn out to be
incorrect or overly simplistic. Two in particular stand out. The first is that implications
are not formed at the conceptual level but instead arise through a later compression pro-
cess; for example, John ate some but not all of the cookies is the intentional message and
this is later compressed into John ate some of the cookies. The alternative is that the
implication is conceived at the conceptual level without the message having to undergo
compression. Our assumption was motivated by the observation that enrichments consid-
ered here, quantity implicatures, are employed more for efficiency reasons than for
speaker intentions (Levinson, 2000). Speakers are not trying to communicate more than
the explicit message by using an implication; it is simply faster for the listener to derive
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the implication than for the speaker to say the words explicitly. It follows that the impli-
cation itself is part of a later, formulation process, rather than the intentional system. But
we admit that there are other sorts of implications for which this reasoning may not
apply. For example, relevance implicatures involve a speaker saying something irrelevant
in order to communicate their message (e.g., A: Mrs X is an old bag; B: Isn’t the weather
lovely?). In these cases the intention behind the message is linked to the use of an impli-
cature (B wishes to communicate a desire not to discuss the topic) and so cannot entirely
be processed by the formulator or monitor.
The second assumption is that implications are mediated by an error monitoring pro-
cess linked to the prearticulatory phase. An alternative is that compression occurs using a
monitoring process, but at an earlier stage in processing. For example, monitoring could
occur between conceptualizer and preverbal message, before the formulator, as in
Levelt’s (1989) conceptualizer-internal loop, which monitors for appropriateness and con-
ceptual errors. The advantage of this model is that the conceptual, contextual, and seman-
tic information needed to make decisions about whether to make an implication would be
readily available from its error-checking function. However, this account would need to
explain why the internal conceptual loop would have access to sentential-level representa-
tions, such as S ^ :S0½ , shared across comprehension and production, as needed to
explain our data.
The different models described above are all possible accounts for a production model
of enrichment, but we lack data to distinguish between them. We look forward to future
experiments that test these ideas. What we can say with certainty is that implication (pro-
duction) and inference (comprehension) have overlapping representations; otherwise we
would not have observed alignment effects between speaker and listener.
5. Conclusion
We presented two experiments that demonstrate interlocutors become aligned in their
use of implications. That it was possible to prime the production of implicatures suggests
that there are overlapping representations involved in implication and inference. More
generally, our study addresses how the comprehension and production of implicatures
interact in the language system, an area of pragmatics that has so far been neglected. We
also suggested a model of implicature production, which, while incomplete and untested,
raises novel questions about the processing of Gricean implicatures.
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Notes
1. We adopt standard linguistics pragmatics terminology whereby the speaker (pro-
duction) is said to imply and the listener (comprehension) to infer.
2. We assume the alternative, S0, is semantically stronger than S (i.e. S0 entails S), in
common with standard formal theories of implicatures (see Fox & Katzir, 2011, for
a review of the constraints needed on alternatives). For example, all is an alterna-
tive to some because all entails some, but not vice versa.
3. It is debatable whether there is activation of implicature representations after refer-
ring to [B] cards, or suppression after referring to [AB] cards, or both. A classical
account of implicatures would require an implicature to identify the [B] card, lead-
ing to elevated activation, but the conventional meaning of the single object utter-
ance is that it is consistent with a double object referent (“The card with a [B]”
means a card with a [B] and possibly something else), and hence would not require
suppression of the implicature. However, some authors assume that the implicature
arises automatically (Horn, 1981; Rooth, 1985), since pragmatic principles and
implicature reasoning themselves are applied by default and no blocking rules are
specified. If the default is to derive the implicature with the single object utterance,
the implicature must be cancelled (i.e., supressed) when referring to the [AB] card.
Thus, some accounts would predict suppression after referring to [AB] cards and
others activation after [B] cards. All we need to assume for our hypothesis, how-
ever, is that one or other of these accounts is correct since both predict opposite
effects on activation for identifying [B] and [AB] referent with single object utter-
ances (one predicts activation after [B] but no effects after [AB], and the other pre-
dicts no effects after [B] but suppression after [AB]).
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